Every litigation committee vote gets paired chain receipts.
In plain English: type the question, get a verdict, and forward two chain links if opposing counsel ever disputes it.
General counsel, settlement committees, fee-petition panels, and discovery review boards need a tamper-proof record of who decided what and when. The Tribunal renders an 8-agent independent vote and writes two receipts to a public ledger — outcome plus an independent shadow re-verification, anchored so tampering visibly breaks the link. Built to support self-authentication under Fed. R. Evid. 902(13)–(14). Same chain as the patent receipts on /; one substrate, two use cases.
Tribunal receipts are tamper-evident records supporting FRCP 26(a) initial-disclosure obligations, FRCP 34(b) production-of-record authenticity, and FRCP 37(e) reasonable-steps spoliation safe-harbor.
Try it in your browser → Book a 20-minute walkthrough or email john@epochcoreqcs.com
Try it in your browser.
Click a sample, or type your own decision. The Tribunal renders an 8-agent vote and writes two chain receipts in under 2 seconds. Both receipts open at chain.epochcoreqcs.com — a public read endpoint with no EpochCore servers in the verification loop.
See what tampering looks like · try to break the receipt
Both URLs below hit the same public chain at chain.epochcoreqcs.com. The first carries the real outcome hash from the round you just ran. The second has its last character flipped — a one-character forgery attempt. Watch the verifier disagree.
The appellate anchor: how the shadow receipt locks the outcome in place.
When the shadow agent fires, it writes a second receipt whose message body contains the outcome receipt's hash. That field original_seal_hash=<outcome> is the anchor. If the outcome is ever altered (impossible on an append-only chain, but illustrative), the anchor field would no longer match the altered outcome's hash — the link visibly breaks.
What the four panels prove. Receipts on the public chain are append-only — a one-character forgery doesn't exist there (panels 1–2). The shadow receipt's message body cryptographically commits to the outcome's hash, so any later alteration of the outcome breaks the visible link (panels 3–4). This is "tampering breaks the link" not as a marketing claim but as a structural property of the substrate.
Concrete example. Your litigation committee votes to approve a settlement offer. The Tribunal renders the vote and writes two receipts. Eighteen months later, opposing counsel disputes whether the committee actually authorized the offer at the figure you produced — you forward two chain links. Read-only, public, resolves in a single GET each. No deposition, no custodian-of-records affidavit for the decision itself.
Three committee members. Five squad specialists. One shadow appellate.
Each agent renders an independent vote. Committee and squad weights sum to 1.00; the shadow holds full veto authority through the appellate receipt — if the round confidence is low, the shadow re-verifies and writes a second receipt anchored to the first.
| Layer | Agent | Specialization | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Committee | Trend Reviewer | Trend & momentum analysis | 0.15 |
| Committee | Scenario Reviewer | Multi-scenario reasoning | 0.20 |
| Committee | Precedent Reviewer | Historical precedent | 0.15 |
| Squad | Materiality Reviewer | Materiality assessment | 0.12 |
| Squad | External-Factors Reviewer | External & environmental factors | 0.08 |
| Squad | Jurisdictional Reviewer | Jurisdictional & venue posture | 0.10 |
| Squad | Quantitative Reviewer | Quantitative regression | 0.10 |
| Shadow | Appellate Verifier | Independent re-verification | 0.10 |
Shadow re-verification triggers when round confidence falls below 85% or any agent's vote diverges sharply from the weighted mean. On trigger, a second chain receipt is written and anchored to the first — tampering with the outcome breaks the link.
Recent tribunal rounds.
Last few rounds on the public chain. Each row is one decision — outcome receipt plus, when present, the shadow appellate receipt. Click any hash to open the live receipt at chain.epochcoreqcs.com.
| Decided at (UTC) | Round | Outcome | Outcome receipt | Shadow receipt |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-17 05:48 | tr_47fff5101dbfd0d6ddb7cff2 |
yes · conf 0.84 | aac116b8dd534f9a…908eb414876e |
56e653f4e155f873…daad4ad6c7b4 (concur) |
| 2026-05-16 07:14 | tr_1be4e584943cc3e8332ea6bf |
yes · conf 0.82 | 065d41e7074809a6…83887e4cdb7f |
7ee718396b591fb1…ed639790f472 (dissent) |
| 2026-05-16 07:11 | tr_10cc1032a15a463c90e8581d |
no · conf 0.78 | 5926f5428d5a9865…548299093756 |
c6477a37360caaec…08605307033c (concur) |
| 2026-05-16 07:07 | tr_cd1b15986b808c888859b27c |
no · conf 0.84 | d07bcc9077cb08c6…e9112245d834 |
9425ecfbe94d77e0…b71549ae8d70 (dissent) |
| 2026-05-16 06:38 | tr_18b44477f6afd4c6aeafba77 |
no · conf 0.79 | 551a289e14a17670…5e2316b0c297 |
225e4f8ecde776e9…6b0c9d799131 (concur) |
| 2026-05-16 06:21 | tr_a82bb1408e678f18dd2ce1e1 |
yes · conf 0.77 | 8111362e619da184…f355b630965b |
14fd0554c8d716bc…809afd3e2c65 (concur) |
| 2026-05-16 05:35 | tr_42eaef38a2c137d8682111a9 |
no · conf 0.80 | 477a572407487697…6b164fbc7afd |
dcffbacad864e768…7b9ee786d41f (dissent) |
| 2026-05-16 05:17 | tr_c708d3cf8a26a24c79c14e2d |
no · conf 0.75 | 624bbd58b4b9c127…d0f138c195ad |
0741588424c2ed27…9d2cc5689c8b (concur) |
| 2026-05-16 04:08 | tr_f482cb1a26250a2e63129bec |
no · conf 0.82 | 701a193dead6635a…93cedae73309 |
62e0d145ff4d5010…58dc77228220 (dissent) |
| 2026-05-15 20:54 | tr_6d8d037d7ecfed2c503d45aa |
no · conf 0.85 | 766bd6556c4476da…8c2fea0f17e3 |
e89913f592ce21f9…b945669fbe05 (dissent) |
Plain table. No hidden tiers.
Pilot pricing — first 30 days free, up to 1,000 rounds — available under mutual NDA for the first five named-firm design partners.
- Full 8-agent + shadow verification
- Both receipts on the public chain
- Email support
- 5,000 rounds included
- Email support 24h SLA
- 99% uptime
- 25,000 rounds included
- Email 8h + guided onboarding
- 99.5% uptime
- 100,000 rounds included
- Dedicated CSM + Slack
- 99.95% uptime
A round = one tribunal decision — the 8-agent vote plus its chain receipts. Shadow re-verifications are part of the same round, not billed separately. Annual pricing saves ~17%; multi-business-unit discounts at 3+ units.
Book a 20-minute walkthrough or email to request pilot terms
Scope, both sides.
- Is An 8-agent independent vote on a decision payload, with both receipts written to a public ledger.
- Is Two receipts per decision — outcome plus an independent shadow re-verification, anchored so tampering breaks the link.
- Is A public verification path that doesn't require this site staying online.
- Not Legal advice. Nothing on this page constitutes a legal opinion.
- Not A substitute for a human committee. The Tribunal is an independent challenge, not a replacement.
- Not A general-purpose oracle. The 8 agents return deterministic-from-payload scores; their value is in the audit pattern, not in oracular truth-telling.
For your security team · technical materials (curl, OpenAPI, Python client, signed capsule)
Hand any of these to your IT, security, or development team. The verification path goes through chain.epochcoreqcs.com — a public read endpoint — and standard cryptographic libraries. Nothing depends on this site staying online.
/tribunal/openapi.json— OpenAPI 3.0.3 spec for the decide endpoint (importable into watsonx Orchestrate, Postman, Insomnia)/tribunal/capsule.json— the signed capsule body (with QUANTUM_WATERMARK header preserved)/tribunal/capsule.sig.json— provenance hashes (SHA-256 + SHA3-256)- Python client (stdlib-only, no
pip install): see the QuantumSwarms/proof-watermarker repo - watsonx Orchestrate skill:
watsonx-bridge.epochcoreras.workers.dev/skills/tournament-decision
Verify a receipt with two curl commands
# 1. Resolve the outcome receipt. curl "https://chain.epochcoreqcs.com/v1/verify?hash=${OUTCOME}&full=1" # ⇒ ok:true, found:true, signatures.post_quantum_dual_sign:true # 2. Resolve the shadow appellate receipt (when present). curl "https://chain.epochcoreqcs.com/v1/verify?hash=${SHADOW}&full=1" # ⇒ the message field contains "original_seal_hash=${OUTCOME}"; # if it doesn't, the link from shadow to outcome has been broken.